From Oct 44 until Mar 45, RSHA VI published its own analyses of world affairs which were circulated only at the highest levels. These reports, which appeared at irregular intervals - about every two or three weeks - were called "EGMONT" reports and classified "Top Secret". For some time SCHELLENBERG, the ambitious head of Amt VI, had been an opponent of HITLER's and RIBBENTROP's foreign policy, considered that HITLER was badly advised by the Ausw Amt. Through his "EGMONT" Reports, which reached HITLER through HIMMLER, SCHELLENBERG, by giving what Prisoner calls "unbiased reports" of political trends, aimed to counteract RIBBENTROP's influence and, if possible, to oust RIBBENTROP from his position.

At the time, SCHELLENBERG's main preoccupation was the necessity of concluding an immediate peace with the Western Allies, in order to salvage as much as he could from a GERMANY which, he considered, had plainly lost the war; he based his hopes for a German renascence on the pattern of events which followed the 1914-18 war. To have said so openly in a report which was read by HITLER, would have been considered high treasn, but SCHELLENBERG, by presenting "objective" reports - GERMANY's position in world affairs being, on any showing, depressing enough - counted on persuading HITLER to listen to the "moderates", and failing this, to convince HIMMLER of the urgent need of betraying his "God" and removing the man who stood in the way of the long-term salvation of GERMANY. Although HIMMLER seems to have accepted the general argument behind the "EGMONT" Reports, he could not bring himself, untel it was too late, to take the drastic step of overthrowing HITLER; HIMMLER's final peace talks with Count BERNADOTTE are historical facts too well known to need recapitulation here. SCHELLENBERG saw in HIMMLER the only man in GERMANY capable of taking over control from HITLER, and possessing sufficient authority to conclude an immediate peace. Prisoner now claims that he himself never saw in HIMMLER more than the head of an interim government for a strictly limited period and mentioned BRÜNING as a possible successor; but these were only nebulous formulations doubtfully accepted by SCHELLENBERG; the main point of agreement between SCHELLENBERG and Prisoner was that HITLER must be removed. HIMMLER hesitated until it was too late and the real aim of the "EGMONT" Reports came to nothing.

  1. WIRSING was the man chosen by SCHELLENBERG to produce the "EGMONT" Reports. His relations with SCHELLENBERG in this connection have been admirably summed up in Liquidation Report No 6, Counter-Intelligence War Room, dated 9 Oct 45.

"The essential conception of SCHELLENBERG's int service was the preparation by amt VI of a properly coordinated summary of political int from all available sources; and SCHELLENBERG to achieve that and did not hesitate to go beyond the recognised organisation of Amt VI..... A striking example is his use of Dr. WIRSING in the preparation of the "EGMONT" Reports. Dr WIRSING was a journalist and author of note whose grasp of political affairs SCHELLENBERG much admired. He was, however, in no sense an Amt VI offr or agent. But SCHELLENBERG, recognising his ability (note: and also a kindred mentality and political ambition) decided that WIRSING, with his wide knowledge of political affairs and his training as a political writer was better fitted for the task he had in mind than any Amt VI offr, and did not hesitate to invite WIRSING to prepare reports on political matters for Amt VI. The remarkable feature is that WIRSING was given access to all Amt VI material likely to be of assistance to him. With his material at his disposal WIRSING prepared reports on various aspects of political importance which were in turn passed to the Zentral Büro (of Amt VI) for further distribution as the "Egmont Berichte". SCHELLENBERG had calculated in this way to have these reports, which attempted to be a true assessment of a deteriorating situation, passed through HIMMLER to HITLER with the hope that the foreign policy of the Reich would be framed to meet realities which HITLER would not face".

Origin of Name

In 1942, Prisoner, while a war-correspondent in RUSSIA, produced a memorandum for AOK IV severly criticising the German adm in occupied RUSSIA. This memo reached HITLER, or, at any rate, his immediate entourage, and Prisoner was considered a carping critic for his remarks. Prisoner, furthermore, had a long-standing disagreement with GOEBBELS and the Propaganda Ministry and had also personally offended RIBBENTROP by refusing to take ober the Infm Sex of of the Ausw Amt in 1941 (see Appendix B). In order, therefore, not to prejudice the value of the Amt VI reports, it was agreed by SCHELLENBERG that they should appear anonymously as "EGMONT" Reports. EGMONT refers to a quotation from GOETHE's EGMONT: "It is not meet to oppose the king, yet one must stand in the way of the king who takes the first unfortunate steps along the wrong path". "King" oviously is not a very subtle allusion to HITLER, while it speaks against Prisoner's acumen that he should consider that HITLER made the first mistakes in autumn 44.

  1. It was a condition of Prisoner's verbal agreement with SCHELLENBERG hat HITLER, GOEBBELS, RIBBENTROP and BORMANN sould in no cirumstances be informed of his activities as "EGMONT". In case of inquiry, SCHELLENBERG would claim authorship himself, but no query of this nature ever arose. The following persons were aware that Prisoner was the author of "EGMONT": HIMMLER, KALTENBRUNNER, the Gruppenchef's of Amt VI, the staff of the Zentralbüro of Amt VI, KRÄMER (by special permission of SCHELLENBERG), TROTT zu SOLZ and Dr Alexander WERTH (both of the Kul Pol Abt of Ausw Amt).

Prisoner's Relations with SCHELLENBERG

In early 44, Prisoner's friend, TROTT zu SOLZ, mentioned in the course of political discussions, that SCHELLENBERG was, for an SS Gen, a "resonable" man, and might be a useful contact. he, TROTT, would arrange a meeting between Prisoner and SCHELLENBERG. TROTT was executed for his part in the 20 July plot, but he had already arranged for a meeting and through SCHELLENBERG's adjutant, SCHMITZ. Prisoner met SCHELLENBERG for a drink at the hotel Adlon in Sep 44. SCHELLENBERG told Prisoner that he had read, and agreed with, Prisoner's most recent book "Das Zeitalter des Ikaros", which contained some veiled criticisms of HITLER. Prisoner then plunged into a long talk on the political situation, the gist of which he hinted that the war was lost, and that in order to get the best terms, GERMANY must make peace now, while she still had some tangible assets with wich she could bargain, eg a partially effective Wehrmacht and occupied territories. Furthermore, prolongation of the war would cause further needless destruction in GERMANY and possibly dangerous internal political repercussions. SCHELLENBERG asked Prisoner whether he was aware that his views were opposed to HITLER's. Prisoner replied that he had no infm as to what HITLER's views might be, but asked whether HITLER had access to reports which might enable him to form a dispassionate, objective judgement. SCHELLENBERG did not answer directly, but asked Prisoner whether he would be prepared to undertake the evaluation of all international material from Amt VI special sources, for use at highest level. From this discussion the "EGMONT" Reports were initiated.

6.In the following month, Prisoner remained in closest contact with SCHELLENBERG and became, in fact, his political adviser. Prisoner made it clear, to SCHELLENBERG that he would not consent to become an official of Amt VI, or even agree to work in the Amt VI offices. SCHELLENBERG therefore instructed his Zentralbüro that every day the relevant Amt VI files should be sent to Prisoner's flat; these were collected again next day and a new batch delivered. This somewhat peculiar arrangement seems to have functioned satisfactorily, and saved Prisoner the trouble of wrestling with adm routine.

  1. About once a week, or once a fortnight - according to the general situation - Prisoner visited SCHELLENBERG at his office, and they spent an afternoon going though the draft "EGMONT" Report which Prisoner had brought with him. SCHELLENBERG rarely made any major alterations, and Prisoner took this opportunity to raise specific points which could only be briefly touched on in the reports, on which he considered SCHELLENBERG sould take action (see para 11).

  1. Prisoner's knowledge of GIS Prisoner claims that his knowledge of GIS org and personalities was slight, and that although he had access to GIS material, he considered himself an outsider and abstained from closer inquiry. Prisoner denies having any knowledge of GIS methods of obtaining int from abroad. He claims to have been aware of the existence of the KOs, but denies knowledge of details. There is no reason to disbelieve Prisoner on this point, since extensive knowledge of the GIS org was not necessary for the production of EGMONT Reports.

At the beginning of Prisoner's collaboration with Amt VI, SCHELLENBERG gave Prisoner a general outline of the GIS, and specifically of the Amt VI org, without disclosing int methods. Prisoner states that as a journalist, he had hitherto had a low opinion of the efficiency of the GIS, and was surprised by the quality of infm available. SCHELLENBERG introduced Prisoner to the heads of his Gruppen, and Prisoner recalls meeting Standf SANDHERGER, Standf STEINE, Ostubaf PAFFGEN, Ostuf CLASSEN, Maj OHLETZ and Oberfeldrichter SCHÖN. SANDHERGER later explained to Prisoner the internal adm of Amt VI. When Amt VI evacuated to BAVARIA in spring 45, Prisoner met Stubaf OHLBRÜCK, Obst BUNTROCK and Ostubaf DAUFELD.

Contents of Reports

Prisoner claims that after a year's imprisonment, his memory is beginning to fail, and he is therefore unable to reconstruct the contents of his reports. He states, on the other hand, that he wrote a fairly complete summary of his reports while he was in American captivity, and could certainly not improve on it. It is not believed that Prisoner is evading the issue on this point; to reconstruct the twelve or thirteen reports after this lapse of time would certainly be a feat of memory. For the sake of completeness, Prisoner's previous reconstruction of the "EGMONT" Reports, taken from the DUSTBIN Report, IN FLAT EP 324-82 (WIRSING) dated 18 Jan 46, is reproduced below.

(Note: The reports are summarised month by month, as Prisoner claims that he could not remember which events were treated in each seperate report)

October 1944

ROOSEVELT's and CHURCHILL's QUEBEC Conference results in the renewed determination for victory in Europe before the Far Eastern victory. Considerable disagreements with RUSSIA as evinced by the decreased lease-lend deliveries. No coordination of Angle-American and Russian conduct of war. This, however, may not be interpreted to inticate that an open conflict between the two groups can be expected before GERMANY's defeat. It means that there will be a race for BERLIN. As the stabilization of the German front in the West has come as a surprise to EISENHOWER and MONTGOMERY, an opportunity presents itself for initiating negotiations with the Western Powers.

(In one of the first reports, Prisoner mentioned Christmas 44 as the last date by which contract would have to be made with EISENHOWER, any later date would lessen GERMANY's chances).

November 1944

STALIN's first turning against JAPAN demonstrates that RUSSIA is sensitive to American pressure in the matter of deliveries (STALIN's speech at the beginning of Nov shortly before the ROOSEVELT elections). Everything indicates that the Far East problem is in the foreground of American politics (regardless of the QUEBEC agreement). ROOSEVELT uses negotiations for deliveries as a means to obtain Russian participation in the Far Ear war, urgently demanded by public opinion in the United States. STALIN's speech is the first concession in this respect. By virtue of her sphinx-like behaviour in the Far East, RUSSIA holds zhe key to the general situation. GERMANY may fear that the Americams will trade Russian concessions in the Far East problem for concessions made to the Russian view-point on Europe and particularly on GERMANY. Therefore, the need for early negotiations with EISENHOWER becomes still more urgent. These negotiations make sense only before complete American-Russion agreement is reached, in which, of necessity, the European and Far East problems are being balanced.

"In ENGLAND no vital interest in this horse-trading of the two others. Great internal tension over foreign policy, by which EDEN himself is affected. The inner circle of the Tories is vitally interested not to have the Russian influence in Europe become too prepondcrating, since this would be in contradiction to the policy of balance of power. The first contact of this influential Tory circle with the Conservative Roman Catholic forces everywhere in Europe. In this connection especially important the role of BIDAULT, who maintains very close contact not only with the Vatican, but also in ENGLAND with personalities like VOIGT and others. Important in this connection CHURCHILL's visit in PARIS on 11 Nov (Plans for Western Block)"

"Importance of this also recognised in MOSCOW, hence invitation to DE GAULLE and BIDAULT to come to MOSCOW; this came as a decidd surprise during CHURCHILL's presence in PARIS".

"There remains a slight chance for GERMANY to make contact with these circles, especially as Amt VI has, contacts with BRÜNING through Switzerland"

(Note: Prisoner had met BRÜNING in 1932, but claims that he hat not kept contact with him. When TROTT and Prisoner were looking for a suitable figurehead for a new Government, BRÜNING's name was mentioned. TROTT then said that he was in contact with BRÜNING tough, Prisoner believes, an American who was working at the International Bank in BASLE, and Anton BÖHM of the Ausw Amt, was also in correspondence tough another source. SCHELLENBERG himself had another personal contact to BRÜNING through SWITZERLAND, but nothing further is known to Prisoner. Prisoner cannot say how far BRÜNING was aware of developments inside GERMANY, but thinks that, up to 20 July, he was kept informetd by TROTT.)

"In the following is given the pivotal point (Note 1 below) of the entire series of EGMONT reports: The Catholic and Conservative Wing cannot possible negotiate conditions in internal politics. The attempt to capitulate only in the West pre-supposes the establishment of corresponding preliminary conditions.

a) in the Roman Catholic problems, b) in the Jewish problem (Note 2, below) c) in the policy in the territories still occupied, especially in DENMARK and NORWAY

Unless this is done, GERMANY is unable to negotiate even with those circles in ENGLAND and AMERICA which view with disfavour so great a Soviet preponderance in EUROPE. References to utterances in this sense by the American DULLES in SWITZERLAND, and by Americans in LISBON."

"(Note 1: The main point, is HITLER's resignation or removal could naturally not be included by SCHELLENBERG expressis verbis in the report. It was made evident by the above-mentioned preliminary condidions, which HITLER would never have been able to fulfil, and HIMMLER naturally only as a transitional solution for quite different forces. Therefore, in the last EGMONT report, the proposal was made to ask BRÜNING to form the new government)"

"(Note 2: Neither HITLER nor HIMMLER understood the above-mentioned reasoning. The only result was that SCHELLENBERG began negotiations with a member of the Swiss Council (Ex-president MUSY) - for the purpose of freeing Jews who were still in German hands; this was later stopped by HITLER. The second consequence was the granting of a few small concessions to DENMARK and NORWAY and to some of the French who had been arrested; these concessions were, however, nullified by the Gestapo.)"

December 1944

In MOSCOW anti-Japanese propaganda continues to be moderate. The main problem of Amercian-Russian relations still remains open. So long as this is the case there remains the infinitesimal chance of saving the unity of GERMANY under Anglo-American occupation. On the other hand the result of DE GAULLE's and BIDAULT's visit in MOSCOW is a renewed defeat for the Tories. RUSSIA demonstrates by this that she too insists on speaking decisively in Western European matters. Infm indicates that no final agreement has yet been reached on the problem of the German zones beyond the decisions reached in TEHERAN. GERMANY must take advantage of this before it happens. In JAPAN first inklings of a move to form a cabinet for peace negotiations under KONOYE.

Battle of the Bulge Interrupts Reports

With the beginning of the LUXEMBURG offensive the reports are interrupted for a while in order to await the results. When Prisoner heard of this plan a short while before, he told SCHELLENBERG that all chances which still existed would be ruined if the offensive was not a huge success, something which could hardly be expected. SCHELLENBERG said that no-one could dissuade HITLER from this plan. He gave Prisoner to understand that HIMMLER was too undecided to act openly against HITLER - although SCHELLENBERG, too, clearly saw that that moment offered irrevocably the last chance.

Beginning January 1945

The LUXEMBURG offensive, though not absolutely decisive, has been relatively successful in that the American deployment has been considerably disturbed for some time and in that GERMANY has proved that it still exists. It is all the more important now to draw the political consequences from this, especially of the Big Three. This is repeated urgently at the end of January. In the meantime, the great Russian offensive has, as could be foreseen, ruined the preliminary conditions which were the basis of the EGMONT reports of October, November and December (Renewed interruptions of the reports)".

End of February 1945

Detailed analysis of the YALTA conference (this report is in American hands.) Prisoner compared all the items which had come to his knowledge and on which an agreement had been reached with those which had remained unsettled. The result of the report: A final accord, as GERMANY had feared for some time, has been reached between the Allies. Presumably it also covers, in principle, the Far East problem, GERMANY's last chance is gone for the realisation of the plan submitted in autumn 1944 (in fact the preliminary conditions in internal politics, which were indispensable, had not been fulfilled.) There can no longer be any hope of a seperate Anglo-American policy, not even with regard to capitulation."

March 1945

The last reports dealt with the opposition in ENGLAND to parts of the YALTA decisions (the Polish question). They gave, however, only a condensed picture of the general situation. The last report recommended the voluntary dissolution of the NSDAP and the appeal to BRÜNUNG to form a new Reich Government.

Sources of "EGMONT" reports

Since the EGMONT Reports were essentially political reports, much of Amt VI's specialised info was of no interest to Prisoner, or served merely as confirmation, in detail, of the general trend already known to him. Under this heading falls all military and most industrial int. Furthermore, since Prisoner was an outsider in Amt VI he made it a point of etiquette not to inquire into the sources of the infm. Lastly as an experimented foreign commentator, Prisoner had acquired, over the years, a thorough knowledge of foreign affairs which continued to serve him for his interpretation of broad policy.

a) Basic Material

Material drawn from sources not connected with the GIS:-

(i) International News Agencies (Reuter, UP, AP, INS, TASS, etc.)

The DNB provided a German translation of all messages sent by the International News Agencies, which came to about 200 pages a day. Security grading was "Secret". Simiarly, they also provided a monitoring service of foreign broadcasting stations. Prisoner received these foreign news summaries as political commentator for "Signal". Prisoner's secretaries undertook the preliminary sifting of this bulky material.

(ii) American an British Papers and Magazines

, eg the airmail edition of "The Times". Previously most of this material had coma via LISBON, but now Prisoner had to rely on the somwhat limited supply from STOCKHOLM.

(iii) Reports from German Embassies in Neutral Countries.

As a political writer of repute, Prisoner, over the years, had formed a numer of personal contacs with high-ranking Ausw Amt officials, from whom he received occasionally infm and guidance regarding the trend of foreign affairs, and who showed him, privately, reports sent in by the embassies in SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, SPAIN and PORTUGAL. During the period of the "EGMONT" Reports his most important contacts were no longer available (eg TROTT zu SOLZ had been executed in summer 44 for his part in the 20 July plot), but Prisoner consulted the following:

Dr SIX Head of Infm Sec, Ausw Amt. SIX did NOT show Prisoner condidential reports.

Dr Alexander WERTH Infm Sex, Ausw Amt. Prisoner's main contact at the time. Provided Ausw Amt reports regarding the Werstern Allies.

Leg Rat HRAUN Far East Sec, Ausw Amt. Provided infm on the Far East.

Dr Anton BÖHM Vatican Referat. Provided infm on Roman Catholic affairs.

(Sdf KRAMER Embassy) STOCKHOLM. In parentheses, KRAMER should be added to this list. KRAMER was aware that Prisoner had difficulty in obtaining access to Ausw Amt reports, many of which were circulating at the embassy in STOCKHOLM. KRAMER made a practice of abstracting infm he thought might interest Prisoner, and forwarding it via the Amt VI courier service to BERLIN with the prefix "for EGMONT". The messages were passed on to Prisoner by Maj OHLETZ of Mil C, without going though normal channels.)

Prisoner states that Embassy reports were in general interesting only for what they failed to report.

(iv) German personalities from Abroad

Prisoner had a very wide circle of acquaintances, many of whom were abroad as foreign correspondents for German papers. Whenever these returned to GERMANY they made a habit of calling on him and exchanging news. Prisoner recalls having spoken to the following during the "EGMONT" period:


SELIGO Correspondent for DINATAG in LISBON. Saw Prisoner in winter 44 in BERLIN.

von TOGGENBURG Former MNN correspondent in STOCKHOLM and personal friend of Prisoner's. TOGGENBURG was fairly frequently in GERMANY and excellently informed.

SCHMITZ MNN correspondent in TURKEY

PÖRZGEN Correspondent of "Frankfurter Zeitung" in SOFIA, formerly in MOSCOW and TANG[..]



Ambassador in SPAIN; on leave in GERMANY in Nov 44. A close personal friend of Prisoner, and well-informed on Anglo-American matters.


Ambassador in ITALY. Also a personal friend of Prisoner. Prisoner met him three times during this period: Aug 44: Prisoner visited RAHN in FASANO to ask him to intervene on behalf of TROTT zu SOLZ Nov 44: Prisoner introduced RAHN to SCHELLENBERG. Prisoner hoped that RAHN might be induced to put out peace feelers for SCHELLENBERG through DULLES in SWITZERLAND, and also act as Amt VI informant. Prisoner denies that RAHN agreed to collaborate with SCHELLENBERG. Dec 44: Prisoner met RAHN in WÜRZBURG to discuss RAHN's Vatican contacts, and the Nazi attitude towards Roman Catholicism, which Prisoner hoped to modify. He wished peace feelers to be sent out through RAHN's Vatican contacts.


Ambassador in TURKEY. Prisoner met von PAPEN in BERLIN after the latter's return from TURKEY in autumn 44.


Prof SCHMITZ Internec repatriated from USA; until the war head of the Deutsche Akademie in NEW YORK.


Another repatriate from USA, member of the BROWN-BOVERI family.

(v) Foreign Personalities

Prisoner denies that during this time he met any foreigners of note. He recalls, however, having some discussions with two members of the Japanese Embassy in BERLIN, regarding the political situation in the Far East:


First (?) Secretary at Japanese Embassy

Adm Koshima

Naval Attache at Japanese Embassy

b) Amt VI Material

Amt VI material , taken by itself, was much too limited in scope to allow Prisoner to draw from it the extensive summaries required for his reports, but it was valuable in that it supplied concrete proofs and substantiated, in many details, his conclusions.

(i) Monitoring Reports (Seehausdienst)

Valuable as supplementary material to the International News Agencies reports (see above). Owing to the paucity of material about the USSR, the Russian sex of this report was specially useful.

(ii) Amt VI Daily Reports (Tagesbericht)

(NOTW: Prisoner has been questioned on SCHELLENBERG's statement that the Daily Reports also went under the covername of "EGMONT" Reports. Prisoner states this must be a misunderstanding; he claims that only his reports were known by this name.)

The Daily Reports recorded, in brief excepts or summaries, all the important messages which had come in during the preciding day, but co-ordination and evaluation of these messages were not attempted, eg from EISBERG (good connections in Roman Catholic circles, military infm must be accepted with reserve). Origin of source was not indicated. The Daily Reports ran to six to twelve pages, and contained military routine material, eg shipping reports drom GIBRALTAR, tactical reports from FAKs, troop movements, chains of comd etc of enemy armies. Prisoner was not interested in this type of int, but looked for items of political int which sometimes were found among these messages.

Prisoner states that he does not remember covernames of these sources, except the following, which provided him with the only valuable political int material:

JOSEPHINE: Provided excellent political sitreps, especially on the Western Allies

EISBERG: Infm about Roman Catholic matters.

HECTOR: Mainly a mil and industrial source.

LEANDER: SCHELLENBERG's private source in LISBON. Through this source SCHELLENBERG obtained an American contact (through DULLES?) and received infm about internal American political personalities.

OSTRO: Another excellent source for political int on Western Powers.

Far East Sources: Mil C ran three agents in the Far East (SHANHAI?), who also seemed well-informed politically; one of these was known as BORODIN. They reported on peace feelers by JAPAN to reach a settlement with CHIANF KAI SHEK, the political situation in CHINA and often good material about Soviet industry and the equipment of Soviet armies in SIBERIA. Once there was also a report on a secret meeting of Japanese and Russian delegates in SIBERIA.

Prisoner admits that he was aware that JOSEPHINEand HECTOR were KRAMER sources, but claims that he deliberately abstained from trying to find out further details. Some JOSEPHINE political int messages carried the prefix "EGMONT" and were passed to Prisoner directly they reaced Amt VI. Prisoner knows nothing about the OSTRO source, except that the infm came through SPAIN.

Under this heading fall also the memos of SCHELLENBERG on conversations he had with personalities of int interest. Prisoner recalls two such memos, one on a conversation with Adm KOSHIMA of the Japanese Embassy in BERLIN, the other on conversations with HUSY.

(iii) Agents' Original Messages

For Prisoner's purposes, the most important and reliable political int was contained in the JOSEPHINEand OSTRO messages. He also remembers the following:


Apparently in close contact with the Swiss IS, and also some contact with DULLES in BERNE. Prisoner believes that JAKOB may have been an agent run directly be SCHELLENBERG.

Contact with Spanish Foreign Office:

A certain amount of material from the Spanish Foreign Office was available. Prisoner remembers several official Spanish reports regarding the political situation in TURKEY. He can give no infm as to how this material was obtained, eg whether it was passed on by the Spaniards, or stolen from Spanish Foreign Office files.

Roman Catholic Sources

Again, Prisoner can give nothing but the vaguest infm. Some of this material was reliable, some of it pure invention. The only source Prisoner can recall is a V-man, designated by a number, whose, no doubt unwitting, informants included the Prior of the SCHEYERN Monastery in BAVARIA and the Bishop of LJUBLJANA in SLOVENIA,

French Source from SWITZERLAND

A private source of SCHELLENBERG's reporting about the internal political difficulties of DE GAULLE and his relations with BIDAULT. This source reported at great length on the significance of DE GAULLE's visit to MOSCOW, winter 45. Prisoner believes this infm may have come from someone close to BONNET, then living in SWITZERLAND.

Chinese source in SWITZERLAND

A private source of SCHELLENBERG's, from which he obtained at the time the sensational disclosure about the YALTA Conference, that the Russians had acted as intermediaries in introducing Japanese represantatives to STETTINIUS. Prisoner still thinks this infm is of doubtful reliability.


There were NO agents' reports.


There were NO agents' reports. In the Daily Report there was, however, occasional mention of the effects of V-weapons, movements of troops, etc.

(iv) Decoding Dept of OKW (Chi-Berichte)

Amt VI received translations of diplomatic telegrams in cipher which had been broken. These were specially useful to Prisoner, since they contained facts which he could test against his own conjectures. There was no continuity of coverage, nor did they reveal any startling news. The infm was necessarily scrappy, but porisoner recollects messages from the following Embassies

Turkish Ambassador in MOSCOW to his Government

This was the only complete coverage available. Messages indicated the extreme pressure which the USSR continually brought to bear on TURKEY.

Bulagarian Ambassador in MOSCOW to his Government

Reported mainly on events in the BALKANS, especially developments in GREECE

Japanese Ambassador in MOSCOW to his Government

Occasional telegrams were deciphered which indicated clearly that the Japanese were having incresing difficulties in maintaining friendly relations with the USSR. Through this source came confirmation from an Amt VI Far East V-man regarding a secret meeting of Japanese and Russian emissaries somewhere in SIBERIA.

(Note: Prisoner has been pressed on the accuracy of his statement, in view of CLASSEN's claim that OKW/Chi III was unable to break Japanese code, anthough in poossession of the Basic Japanese code-book (CSDIC(WEA) Final Report 85 on CLASSEN, Appendix C, para i, dated 27 July 45. Prisoner nevertheless maintains his contention.)

Ambassador HARRIMAN in MOSCOW to the State Dept on Russo-Polish relations.

Polish mission in JERUSALEM to Polish Govt in LONDON. Continuous coverage of reports on developments in BALKANS and NEAR EAST, especially ELAS rising.

Bulgarian Envoy in SWITZERLAND to his Government

Reported on BALKAN affairs and attitude of Western Powers towards BALKANS.

American missions in BALKANS

Reported on difficulties with Russians.


Announced the arrival of Ambassador CAFFERY

British Codes

Prisoner does not recollect seeing an intercept from a British code

(v) Evaluated material from Amt VI Gruppen

This consisted mostly of the reports by the various Gruppen concerning either their geographical spheres as a whole, or detailed analysis of a specific point.

Summary of activities in SOUTH AMERICA; monthly reports on the FAR EAST. For example, the Far East Referat prepared a monthly report on events in the FAR EAST. Other reports concerned the effect of V-weapons in the UK, British political pressure on TURKEY, character-sketches of new political foreign personalities and an analysis of the American elections.

Summing up all the sources of infm available to hin, Prisoner concludes that on the whole, only the JOSEPHINE and OSTRO Reports were genuine and reliable political int. It was, therefore, Prisoner's practice, before committing to paper his own analysis of important political developments, to await the JOSEPHINE and OSTRO telegrams on this point, which, however, agreed generally with his own views. Thus, in the matter of the YALTA conference, apart from the international news releases and radio commments, Prisoner received infm from three sources:

SCHELLENBERG's private Chinese source, reporting American-Japanese peace negotiations. This news was treated with reserve, and Prisoner awaited confirmation.

OSTRO gave a full and reliable report on the YALTA Conference about ten days later; there was no mention of the Japanese envoys.

JOSEPHINE (KRÄMER through ONODERA in STOCKHOLM) reported about a week after OSTRO; this was the most reliable of all three. There was no mention of the Japanese envoys.

There were NO WT intercepts on YALTA.


Draft Reports handed in by Prisoner to SCHELLENBERG after final discussions were headed "EGMONT Berichte", and were passed out on the authority of KALTENBRUNNER. Prisoner is unable to say whether KALTENBRUNNER made any corrections before they left the RSHA. The reports were then retyped in special "Führer-type" (an especially large typewriter) on RSHA VI paper and headed "Aussenpolitische Lageberichte". (Prisoner claims he only glanced at one such final copy and is not certain of the exact phraseology.) With each copy went a note from KALTENBRUNNER, saying: "Herewith the latest report from Amt VI".

External distribution was as follows:

* One copy to FEGELEIN for HITLER.

  • One copy to HEWEL, Ausw Amt LO at FHQ. HEWEL had given a written undertaking that he would not show these reports to RIBBENTROP.
  • One copy to HIMMLER.
  • One copy to SEYSS-INQUART (a personal friend of KALTENBRUNNER).

Internal RSHA Distribution of "EGMONT" Reports was:


  • Several copies kept by SCHELLENBERG, who may have given them to various persons at his discretion. For instance Ogruf LORENZ read many of the reports and Prisoner believes that SCHELLENBERG circulated them among his Gruppenleiters.
  • One copy kept by Prisoner.

Addenda to "EGMONT" Reports

As a rule, each "EGMONT" Report contained a short addendum, in the form of a private aide-memoire for SCHELLENBERG. In it Prisoner raised specific points at greater length than was pissible in a political survey; these points were the result of the several hours' discussion Prisoner had with SCHELLENBERG before the publication of each "EGMONT" Report. During these discussions, especially in the later stages, SCHELLENBERG and Prisoner openly discussed what could be done to end the war in the light of the existing situation, and any concrete measure which might contribute to that end was touched on during the discussions, eg. the MUSY negotiations to release the Jews from the concentration camps (aim: favourably influencing world opinion towards GERMANY); negotiations for the release of Danish police and Danish Jews from concentration camps; release of five Swedes sentenced to death in the WARSAW trials (aim: to win the goodwill of SWEDEN as a prerequisite for SWEDEN's services as intermediary in peace negotiations); reversal of Gauleiter's HOFER's radical anti-Catholic policy in AUSTRIA (aim: to maintain what Prisoner considered the vital goodwill of Vatican circles, through whom peace feelers were also attempted); These were all relatively small points which SCHELLENBERG could bring up in the course of his interviews with HIMMLER, who in turn might either give the desired instructions on his own responsibility or try and obtain HITLER's sanction at a convenient opportunity. The aide-memoires were essentially brief's for SCHELLENBERG, stating the problem and recommending action to be taken. Through them SCHELLENBERG, in fact, became the mouth-piece of Prisoner, and Prisoner was gratified by the influence he could exercise without assuming public responsibility.

Destruction of "EGMONT" Reports

Prisoner has been interrogated at some length on this point. He professes ignorance as to the whereabouts of any of the reports distributed through Amt VI. His own personal copies, he claims, were destroyed in the last days of Apr 45. Pressed for details on the alleged destruction, Prisoner slightly modified the version he gave previously, and now states the following:

When Amt VI evacuated to BAVARIA in spring 45, Prisoner, with four or five other Amt VI officials, was living in BAD HEILBRUNN. There Prisoner met Ostubaf DAUFELD of Amt VI, who had recently been expelled from SWITZERLAND for int activities for Amt VI. DAUFELD introduced Prisoner to his father-in-law, GUT, the owner of the Hotel Kaiserhof in BAD TÖLZ. GUT agreed to let Prisoner use the safe in his hotel, and the "EGMONT" Reports were deposited there, since Prisoner did not wish to have them in his billet. Prisoner states that GUT and Frau DAUFELD know only that "the yellow folder" contained secret state documents; Ostubaf DAUFELD was aware that it contained the "EGMONT" Reports.

From 29 Apr to 2 May 45 Prisoner was in FLENSBURG (see Appendix C). During this time BAD TÖLZ was overrun by American troops. Ostubaf DAUFELD was in hiding at the time, but before he left he gave instructions to his wife and father-in-law not to let the "yellow folder" fall into enemy hands. Shortly before the Americans arrived, GUT and Frau DAUFELD burned these reports. Prisoner learned these facts from DAUFELD himself, who was later arrested by the Americans, and together with Prisoner was at FREISING, 3rd US Army Interrogation Centre.

A few days after Prisoner's return from FLENSBURG, in the first week of May 45, Prisoner's secretary, Frau Hannelore RAHM, went to BAD TÖLZ and learned that the documents had been destroyed. She related this to Prisoner, and it was from her that he first knew of their destruction. Prisoner insists that when he left for FLENSBURG, he gave NO instructions to anyone what to do with the reports in the case of American occupation.

Two Reports believed captured

Prisoner believes that two reports have been captured. At beg Jun 45, Prisoner was interrogated at FREISING by Capt FLEX, US Army, who told him that the "EGMONT" Report about YALTA had been found among documents seized at SEYSS-INQUART's HQ. Later, in Dec 45, Lt MITTELBERGER told Prisoner in OBERURSEL that another copy had recently been found.

Prisoner's Relations with KRÄMER

KRÄMER, thourgh his JOSEPHINE Reports, was Prisoner's most important source for the "EGMONT" Reports. Furthermore, KRÄMER was the only int agent personally known to Prisoner. His relations with KRÄMER may therefore be of interest.

Prisoner made KRÄMER's acquaintance in Mar or Apr 43, when KRÄMER called on Prisoner in BERLIN with a letter of introduction from TOGGENBURG. As a political journalist Prisoner always welcomed an exchange of infm with well-informed persons from abroad, although this had become more difficult since the war. Even during KRÄMER's first visit it was evident that he was extremly well informed, especially about political trends in the UK and USA. KRÄMER introduced himself as a member of the German Embassy in STOCKHOLM, and Prisoner asked him to call again on his next visit to BERLIN. KRÄMER afterwards called regularly on Prisoner whenever he happened to be in BERLIN, wehich was usually about once a month or every six weeks. The two men became personal friends, since they found their political outlook to be very similar, and they had systematic discussions covering all aspects of the international situation, eg the military situation, political trends among Axis and Allied powers, the role of the chief political personalities, Allied intentions, strategy, etc. Prisoner states that before the war, he was accustomed to have many such discussions with other, similarly well-informed persons, mostly journalists or members of the Ausw Amt. Now, however, there remained only TROTT zu SOLZ and Albrecht HAUSHOFER (both executed after the 20 July plot). KRÄMER's infm, for him, was therefore specially valuable, since this infm, especially his knowledge of the UK, was apperently based on facts and not on surmise and conjecture.

At first, KRÄMER did not mention his duties in STOCKHOLM. After some time, he hinted that they were in connection with the GAF Führungsstab, and about a year after their first meeting, he told Prisoner he was a member of the Abw. Prisoner claims that he studiously avoided inquiring into details or questioning KRÄMER about the sources of his infm.

Prisoner claims that until autumn 44 he made no use of the political int he heard from KRÄMER. He stoutly maintains that as a journalist and political writer, it was his job and ambition to be well-informed; the fact that he was then working in a minor capacity on the propaganda journal "Signal", for which this infm was unnecessary, was irrelevant. KRÄMER's conversatons corroborated Prisoner's growing conviction that GERMANY was losing the war, and that an early negotiated peace with the Western Powers was the only way out, a conviction shared by, among others, KRÄMER himself and TROTT zu SOLZ, who was also working towards that end.

When Prisoner began his career as "EGMONT" he told SCHELLENBERG that he knew KRÄMER, and asked permission to make use of KRÄMER directly. KRÄMER told Prisoner that the JOSEPHINE reports came via a Swedish source, and their conversation now included operational and mil questions, on which subject KRÄMER hat hierherto shown a certain reserve. But Prisoner still did NOT question KRÄMER about his sources of infm.From time to time, Prisoner asked KRÄMER for confirmation or elaboration of certain political news he had received from other Amt VI sources; these briefs were sent to KRÄMER via amt VI, and his replies were prefixed "for EGMONT". Prisoner states that KRÄMER was the only int offr with whom he was in contact - otherwise he knew only covernames of reports. For instance, the identity of OSTRO, the only other source of high political int value, was not known to Prisoner.

KRÄMER was aware of Prisoner's political significance as "EGMONT". Although, for his own sake, Prisoner hat not taken KRÄMER into his full confidence regarding his political intentions, KRÄMER knew of, and supported Prisoner's and SCHELLENBERG's attempt to negotiate a peace with the Western Allies. By 1945, KRÄMER was able to discuss German peace overtures openly with SCHELLENBERG when he went to report to Amt VI, and KRÄMER kept SCHELLENBERG informed directly of the political situation.

During Prisoner's visits to BEST in COPENHAGEN (see Appendix D paras 30 and 31) he met KRÄMER for discussions. These, however, differed in no way from the talks they had in Berlin.

Prisoner's Relations with PFLEIDERER

PFLEIDERER fits into the framework of SCHELLENBERG's and Prisoner's overriding interest in SCANDINAVIA as the only remaining German asset. Prisoner and SCHELLENBERG were both agreed that the TERBOVEN-HITLER policy of resistance and scorched earth in NORWAY and DENMARK was mistaken. Meanwhile, KRÄMER had become friendly with PFLEIDERER, head of the Consular Dept in the German Legation at STOCKHOLM, who also desired to see better relations between SWEDEN and GERMANY, the more so, since the Swedish Govt would be unlikely to act on GERMANY's behalf in any peace negotiations unless their most pressing demands were sympathetically considered.

At beg Mar 45, KRÄMER reported to Prisoner that PFLEIDERER, an expert on Scandinavian affairs, had had some unofficial talks with Danish and Swedish personalities on the subject and regarded with deepest dismay the present German policy.

Towards end Mar 45, whilst PFLEIDERER happened to be in BERLIN, he went to see Prisoner at KRÄMER's suggestion and discussed the whole Scandinavian question very openly. The substance of this conversation has been fully reported in CSDIC(EWA) Final report on PFLEIDERER, Appendix E, paras 6-10 and has been confirmed by Prisoner. Prisoner asked PFLEIDERER to let him have a memorandum on SCANDINAVIA; PFLEIDERER wrote this on his return to STOCKHOLM, and sent it to Prisoner through KRÄMER. This memorandum was incorporated in another "addendum" to an "EGMONT" Report, stressing that unless SCHELLENBERG could bring HIMMLER to take immediate action to reverse or at least soften HITLER's Scandinavian policy, peace negotiations through SWEDEN would inevitably fail.


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Backlinks: Historisches:Giselher Wirsing